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Music is known to alter people’s ordinary experience of space and time. Not only does
this challenge the concept of invariant space and time tacitly assumed in psychology but
it may also help us understand how music works and how music can be understood as an
embodied experience. Yet research about these alterations is in its infancy. This review is
intended to delineate a future research agenda. We review experimental evidence and
subjective reports of the influence of music on the representation of space and time
and present prominent approaches to explaining these effects. We discuss the role of
absorption and altered states of consciousness and their associated changes in attention
and neurophysiological processes, as well as prominent models of human time processing
and time experience. After integrating the reviewed research, we conclude that research
on the influence of music on the representation of space and time is still quite inconclusive
but that integrating the different approaches could lead to a better understanding of the
observed effects. We also provide a working model that integrates a large part of the
evidence and theories. Several suggestions for further research in both music psychology
and cognitive psychology are outlined.
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Time and space—time to be alone, space to move about—these
may well become the great scarcities of tomorrow.
Edwin Way Teale
INTRODUCTION
The way people orient themselves and behave in the world
essentially depends on spatial and temporal magnitudes. Simple
actions require a coherent and appropriate representation of the
surrounding space as well as of the chronological time that is
intrinsic to physical and biological processes. People may ini-
tially have the naïve impression that (1) ordinary (Euclidean)
space and chronological time are invariant physical magnitudes,
and that (2) orientation and behavior work best when people
are able to represent both space and time as accurately as pos-
sible. Both assumptions have been proven wrong, however. From
a physical standpoint, modern physics—going back to Einstein’s
work in the early twentieth century—and especially quantum
mechanics have abandoned the idea of invariant space and time.
Instead, it is known that space can be bent or dilated and time
can pass at various speeds, depending on the perspective of the
beholder. Of course, these physical peculiarities are far from our
human scope of experience. But also from a psychological point
of view, it appears that our representation of space and time is
alterable and malleable. Both entities are a product of conscious
and unconscious processing, affected by perceptions, memories,
moods and emotions, our interests and current goals, and our
physiological condition. Neither space nor time is a characteris-
tic of objects or events in the outside world that we “perceive.”
Rather, both are characteristics of our mental representations of
what we categorize as objects or events.
Psychology has only just begun to acknowledge the change-
ableness and dynamics of people’s representations of space and
time (see Clark, 1998; Michon, 1998; Buhusi and Meck, 2005;
Vaitl et al., 2005; Woods et al., 2012). Because people describe
the world in terms of space and time continually, it should be of
the utmost interest to psychologists to consider the representation
of these concepts when thinking about psychological processes in
each domain of their research. To date, this has not been the case;
when space and time appear in psychological processes they are
consistently thought of as static dimensions that can be measured
by rulers and clocks. But because space and time are representa-
tions of subjective mental operations—and therefore flexible and
malleable—such an approach may contain considerable pitfalls.
The importance of spatial and temporal information to the
understanding of psychological processes becomes particularly
evident when these processes are considered from the perspec-
tive of embodied cognition. According to the embodied cognition
(or embodied mind) hypothesis, cognitions and mental opera-
tions are influenced and shaped by the state and condition of the
body and its spatial and temporal positioning. That is, thoughts,
concepts, categories, plans, mental images, and intentions can-
not be considered isolated entities but are all contingent on
the body. The rationale for this hypothesis is that cognitions
and mental operations are always related to intentionality, that
is, to the question of what can be done with them (see, e.g.,
Wilson, 2001; Gallagher, 2013). The body’s positioning refers
to perception, proprioception, and motor action, which are all
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characterized by the integration and fine tuning of spatial and
temporal information.
We sought to analyze the alteration of the subjective rep-
resentation of space and time using a simple and ubiquitous
everyday behavior that is known to affect people’s normal state
of consciousness: listening to music. Music, as (1) a continu-
ous flow of auditory input and (2) something that is done or
performed by someone, evidently has the potential to affect the
mental representation of space and time. We give an overview of
the research that has been done with music and that has pro-
vided evidence of the multiple ways in which listening to music
can influence the ordinary representation of space and time.
We also discuss models and theories that have been adopted to
explain these influences, including psychological, neurobiologi-
cal, and phenomenological approaches. Finally, we ask how the
results of this review can help us better understand the topic
of music and the embodied mind and try to delineate sugges-
tions for further research in both music cognition and cognitive
psychology.
MUSIC AND THE REPRESENTATION OF TIME
There is both experimental evidence and evidence from sub-
jective reports of altered representation of time while listening
to music. Experimental research has been concerned with time
estimation, that is, with judgments of the duration of certain
intervals and—more rarely—with the subjective flow of time dur-
ing these intervals. In addition, there are studies that analyzed
reports about subjective experiences collected in surveys and inter-
views. We summarize both lines of research along with the most
prominent approaches to explaining their findings.
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE OF ALTERED REPRESENTATIONOF TIME
Human time estimation depends on what stimuli are present
and what is happening in the interval to be estimated. To illus-
trate processes of overestimation and underestimation of time
intervals more precisely, researchers speak of a “leftward shift”
(←), meaning the estimated duration of events is shorter than
the chronological extent measured (as reference), or a “rightward
shift” (→), meaning estimated durations are longer (see Meck,
1996, 2005).
Typically, music has been thought to shorten the estimation
of interval length. Rai (1973) found that music-filled intervals
were estimated as shorter (←) than noise-filled, light-filled, and
unfilled intervals, respectively. In line with Rai’s results, findings
from a series of studies using simple waiting situations showed
that time intervals were estimated as being shorter (←) when
music was played (MacNay, 1995; North and Hargreaves, 1999;
Roper and Manela, 2000; Guéguen and Jacob, 2002; Kämpfe,
2011), and Droit-Volet et al. (2010) recently demonstrated a
decrease (←) in people’s time interval estimates while listening
to music using a temporal bisection task.
Arousal, familiarity, affective response, and music preference
have been considered explanatory variables in the relationship
between music and time estimation.When investigating estimates
of advertisement durations, Kellaris and Mantel (1996) found an
underestimation (←) of the duration of music-filled intervals,
which was even stronger when the music was more arousing than
less arousing. In contrast, other researchers have found that loud
music (which is more arousing than soft music) led to longer esti-
mates (→; Kellaris and Altsech, 1992), as did faster music (which
is more arousing than slower music;→; Oakes, 2003; Droit-Volet
et al., 2013).
Bailey and Areni (2006) investigated the role of familiarity and
found that the decrease of time interval estimates (←) was more
pronounced when the music under study was familiar as opposed
to unfamiliar. Similarly, Yalch and Spangenberg (1990) found that
shoppers in a department store reported shorter time estimates
(←) when music was played that they would usually listen to—
relative to music they would not usually select. In contrast, studies
by Gulas and Schewe (1994) and Yalch and Spangenberg (2000)
yielded time duration estimates that were longer (→) under the
influence of familiarmusic than under the influence of unfamiliar
music.
Given that previous research showed that affective responses
to music might influence time perception, as well (e.g., Kellaris
and Kent, 1992), the effect of familiarity may have been mediated
by affective responses. However, Bailey and Areni (2006) ruled
out this explanation in their study; and Droit-Volet et al. (2010)
demonstrated that music in major mode (which is more strongly
associated with positive affect) and music in minor mode (which
is more strongly associated with negative affect) do not differ in
their influence on time perception.
Not least, it has been suggested that music preference mediates
music’s influence on time perception. Lopez andMalhotra (1991)
found that interval durations were overestimated (→) when peo-
ple listened to their least preferred music and underestimated
(←) when they listened to their most preferred music. Hui et al.
(1997) found that positively valenced music increased perceived
wait duration (→) and Cassidy and MacDonald (2010) found
that exposure to self-selected music resulted in overestimation
of time (→) as compared to experimenter-selected music, but
Cameron et al. (2003) again found that listeners evaluated wait-
ing time durations as being shorter (←) the more they liked the
music that was played in the background.
By way of summary, music listening typically leads to a left-
ward shift, that is, an underestimation of time intervals. Taking
familiarity, arousal potential, and likeability into account, how-
ever, leaves us with a rather puzzling picture: In some cases,
time interval estimates are in a positive relationship with these
variables but in other cases, the relationship is negative.
EVIDENCE FROM SUBJECTIVE REPORTS OF ALTERED
REPRESENTATIONOF TIME
Apart from the results of experimental studies on time estima-
tion, there is also evidence from subjective reports collected in
surveys and interview studies. The vast majority of such reports
come from research about music listening and altered states of
consciousness (ASCs), because an altered representation of time
is one of the predominant characteristics of ASCs (Dietrich, 1996;
Vaitl et al., 2005; see also Studerus et al., 2010). As will be apparent
below, the relationship between these studies is rather loose. Most
of the studies had a focus other than time experience in music lis-
tening, so that they came across changes in the representation of
time rather incidentally.
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The most widely reported experiences with regard to music
listening are the feelings of timelessness and time dilation. Hills
and Argyle (1998) found that musical experiences are highly sim-
ilar to religious experiences in that both are characterized by the
feeling of timelessness. Kohlmetz et al. (2003) investigated the
performance of a pianist playing for 28 h and found him to reach
meditative states characterized by “the loss of the external frame-
work (time, space, and bodily sensation) and mental content
(inner and outer perception)” (p. 174). In her profound quali-
tative investigation of everyday music listening, Herbert (2011,
p. 76) summarized that “typically, time may appear to feel pro-
tracted in the present moment of experience, but may seem to
have passed quickly when that experience is remembered.”
Hutson (2000) described the ritual character of rave parties
where people can experience ASCs that include the feeling of
timelessness. Evidently, such experiences are an effect not only
of listening to music but also—and probably even more so—of
dancing to themusic. Dancing translatesmusic to a bodily expres-
sion and thereby is an example par excellence of the embodied
repercussion of outer stimuli (sounds) on the inner experience.
Remarkably, the occurrence of such extraordinary states does not
depend on psychoactive drug use (see also Baldemair, 2003).
However, triggering and binding to corresponding endogenous
neurotransmitters and their receptor systems in the brainmediate
the pharmacokinetics and dynamics of induced psychoactive drug
action (Julien et al., 2008). Thus, induced drug action on music
experience represents a model of endogenous neurotransmitter
action onmusic processing (Fachner, 2000). Fachner (2000, 2008)
showed that cannabis can intensify musicians’ time perception
so that they experience time as dilated, which provides them
greater temporal scope to develop and perceive musical struc-
tures and elements. He argued that cannabis affects the perception
of time, space, and frequency, which intensifies the perception
of temporal–spatial sound figures and leads to psychoacoustic
quality intensification.
In a large-scale qualitative study, Gabrielsson and Lindström
Wik (2003; see also Gabrielsson, 2001, 2002, 2011) found
that strong experiences with music were often characterized by
changes in time perception (time disappears, goes slower or
faster). Exemplary statements of interviewees were “We stood
outside time,” “Time had stopped; it felt as a single longmoment,”
“I often have a feeling of eternity in connection with the experi-
ence of music” (Gabrielsson and LindströmWik, 2003, p. 174). In
addition, altered perception of time was often related to feelings of
trance, ecstasy, or transcendence. Not least, an interesting descrip-
tion of an alternative conceptualization of time within music was
given by Roswell (1986), who detailed that Indian music operates
without concepts such as counting and rhythm and where time
is rather latent. About temporality in Indian music he stated that
“structure is mutable and substance is malleable” and that “forms
are fluid and constantly shifting” (p. 233).
In sum, studies about the subjective experience of time under
the influence of music in intense listening situations typically
found time being experienced as either slowing down or disap-
pearing. However, the evidence of subjective experiences either
relies on only a few participants or refers to rather broad
categories (such as changed perception of time during intense
experiences with music). Thus, evidence of such subjective expe-
rience of time is accordingly scarce and conclusions are limited.
APPROACHES TO EXPLAINING ALTERED REPRESENTATIONOF TIME
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF MUSIC
We now introduce several theoretical approaches to explaining
the effects of music on the representation of time. We discuss
attention-based models, memory-based models, phenomenolog-
ical models, models that refer to absorption and ASCs, and some
basic neurophysiological explanations.
Attention-based models
The most prominent approaches to explaining the distortions of
time interval estimates under the influence of music are attention-
based models andmemory-based models of human time process-
ing (e.g., Block and Zakay, 1996; Brown, 1997; Zakay and Block,
1997). For instance, according to the attentional gate model (Zakay
and Block, 1997), music distracts cognitive processing away from
time processing, which leads to a decrease in the estimation of
elapsed time in retrospect and to the feeling that “time flies” in
the immediacy of the current experience.
Our sense of subjective time is thought to fluctuate in rela-
tion to clock time according to the amount of information we
receive per second. Tse proposed the idea of a simple counter
model, arguing that the brain “has access to the approximate con-
stant rate of its own information processing” (in Eagleman et al.,
2005, p. 10369). For example, if one bit of information processed
is interpreted as one unit of objective time, then—in moments
when attention is shifted from and/or increased on (a series of)
engaging percepts—two or three bits of information would be
counted again as one unit of objective time, “creating the illu-
sion that time and motion had slowed down” (Eagleman et al.,
2005, p. 10369). Only a specific, individually and situationally
relevant excerpt of sensory data is accessible to our conscious-
ness (with an upper limit of around 15–20 bits/s), as outlined in
an information-based model of the optimization and throttling
of sensory input and output during top-down and bottom-up
processing of sensory information (Spreng and Keidel, 1963).
However, to date, the problem of how bits of information can be
counted in musical selections remains unsolved:
It depends on the individual, how well he knows the given musical
style, his ability to codify musical events, and his ability to con-
centrate during the performance . . .. Experience and training thus
have a direct relation to the amount of “information” that can be
grasped from a musical phrase. (Mountain, 1989, p. 4).
Nonetheless, is has also been argued that the inner pacemaker is
influenced by physiological arousal (Zakay and Block, 1997). If
music increases arousal, the pacemaker is thought to accelerate,
resulting in an overestimation of the elapsed time in retrospect
(see Oakes, 2003; Droit-Volet et al., 2013). As we mentioned
above, however, some studies found just the opposite: Higher
arousal resulted in shorter estimates (Kellaris and Mantel, 1996).
The authors argued that “the presence of arousing music may
have occupied attentional resources that would otherwise have
been devoted to processing the information in the test ads, with
attendant effects onmemory-based temporal inferences” (p. 510).
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That is, the influence of arousal on time estimation may be
mediated by attention. Moreover, arousal has also been shown
to influence music preference (Schäfer and Sedlmeier, 2011), so
that higher arousal may lead to a higher preference and, in turn,
to shorter time interval estimates. And, not least, the focus of
attention—being either broad or narrow—depends on affective
states (Friedman and Förster, 2010) and motivational intensity
(Harmon-Jones et al., 2011). Effects of affect and motivation on
time estimation could therefore be explained by the mediating
effect of attention. This has not yet been investigated with regard
to music listening.
In sum, attention-based approaches in their current form can
explain some—but by no means all—of the findings about the
influence of music on the estimation of time intervals. A major
problem in models such as the attentional gate model is that
they have two degrees of freedom: the pace of the pacemaker and
the degree of attention directed to the time. Both these variables
can be influenced by musical characteristics such as tempo, loud-
ness, emotional expression, complexity, familiarity, or likeability
in manifold ways. Themodels are still not precise enough to allow
clear predictions about which of the two parameters is influenced
by which of the musical characteristics so that eventually they
sometimes appear to explain any empirical result, regardless of
in which direction it goes.
Memory-based models
Memory-based models of psychological timing (see Ornstein,
1969; Kellaris and Mantel, 1996) reason that the more informa-
tion is processed in a period of time, the more “traces” remain
in memory, which results in longer time estimates in retrospect.
Music—as compared to silence—would require more processing
and produce more traces in memory.
Whether traces are built in memory and whether they can
be retrieved easily later depends on several variables, the most
important of which are engagement in the listening experience
and evoked affect. Pöppel (2000)—in line with James (1890)—
used the term time paradox to describe when time periods with
a dense event structure that are subsequently recalled are esti-
mated as prolonged when the events are engaging, even when
the physical duration is objectively short. It seems that “time
judgments can distort, recalibrate, reverse, or have a range of
resolutions depending on the stimulus and on the state of the
viewer” (Eagleman et al., 2005, p. 10370; see also Kramer, 1988).
The “state of the viewer” seems to depend especially on the affec-
tive state. Frightening film passages were recalled as being longer
than sad or so-called neutral excerpts (Droit-Volet et al., 2011).
State-dependent cognition and state-dependent recall of time
passages and cross-temporal binding of events aremore profound
when they are connected to strong emotional and personally
meaningful experiences (Fachner, 2010, 2011).
In sum, memory-based models can account for the observa-
tion that people overestimate temporal durations in retrospect
under the influence of music. The models also claim that this
effect is more pronounced when listeners are more engaged in the
experience or encounter stronger affect. There are, however, only
a few studies that empirically tested these conjectures. In addi-
tion, research has been done to compare memory-based models
with attention-based models, with results usually favoring the
attention-based explanations (see North and Hargreaves, 2008).
Phenomenological models
Some scholars have suggested that what we call time “percep-
tion” might be better understood as a mental construction that
is continuously updated during “ordinary” mental functioning
(see Fraisse, 1963, 1984; Thomas and Brown, 1974; Block and
Reed, 1978; Poynter, 1983; Le Poidevin, 2009). This construc-
tion may be built through single events in human consciousness
(temporal markers, such as the number of breaths, the number
of lines of a paper read) and the fact that people have learned to
label a specific number of such events with a specific declaration
of how much time they lasted (see Flaherty’s, 1999, concept of
synchronicity below; see Betsch et al., 2010, for the influence of
stimulus frequency on duration judgments). In this respect, the
experience of time is always a relative experience (Michon, 1998).
Under the influence of music, this construction may be changed
more or less drastically in that there are no more single events in
the consciousness but only the music that expands to a bound-
less moment. Next we present two influential phenomenological
models. The first is centered around the subjective flow of time;
the second is Flaherty’s (1999) philosophical–sociological model.
The notion that time is a construction rather than a perception
is intrinsic to phenomenological approaches to time conscious-
ness. With reference to Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty,
James, and others, scholars have delineated a model of the phe-
nomenology of temporality, the flow of time, and the experience
of what we call the present or the now (e.g., Varela, 1999a,b;
Gallagher and Varela, 2003; Pockett, 2003; Gallagher, 2009, 2011,
2013). Central to the model is the notion that the relationship
between the experience of time and the temporal structure of
events in the real physical world is neither linear nor following
a fixed rhythm or pulse. What we experience as now or present
is a mental act of integrating a certain number of perceivable
stimuli (represented by single post-synaptic potentials) into a sin-
gle unit of content within consciousness (referred to as a time
object). Time objects are embodied entities, as their function is
to nurture cognitions that are directed toward potential inten-
tional actions of the individual. They seem to be established by
temporary synchronization of cell assemblies across the brain and
last between 0.5 and 3 s (see Pöppel, 1988; Linke, 2005). These
units can be either strung together without a gap or separated
by gaps of varying duration. The gaps facilitate the involvement
of the ego, which integrates the single contents of consciousness
into the absolute flow of a person’s coherent past. Without these
gaps there is no ego and we would live in an everlasting present.
This eventually means that we have an experience of the flow of
time only because we have conscious access to our memory. (As
Julian Barnes puts it in his lovely novel The Sense of an Ending,
“this personal time, which is the true time, is measured in your
relationship to memory.”)
The phenomenological model of temporality further states
that the number and order of perceivable stimuli that get bound
together to form a unit is flexible, as is the temporal rhythm
of succeeding units. This simply means that the experience of
temporality is malleable: What we perceive as now or present
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can have a very different duration in physical time. Hence, the
“flow of time” can change because the succession of experi-
enced moments of “nowness” occurs against the background of
memory—a notion quite similar to Flaherty’s (1999) approach
discussed below. The length and temporal succession of the single
units depend on memory, personality, affect, intentions, physi-
ological conditions, and of course currently perceivable stimuli.
Music may influence both the length of the units (how many
notes or musical elements are bound together) and the existence
and duration of gaps between them. Music that is more capti-
vating will cause the listener to become addicted to the flux of
pure perception, giving rise to only a few moments in which the
ego can make a conscious judgment of elapsed time. As a result,
time might seem to disappear (when there are no gaps at all), to
speed up (when temporal judgments are made rarely), or to slow
down (when the music is boring or disagreeable so that temporal
judgments are made more often than usual).
Flaherty (1999) presented a philosophical–sociological
approach to human time processing, starting with the notion
that time is a construct of consciousness and in that way affected
by societal conventions and the inner processes of the individual.
He proposed three forms of temporal experience: “Protracted
duration” refers to the immediacy of the current experience and
to the feeling that time is passing more slowly than usual. This
happens in the course of very intense, exceptional, or non-routine
experiences, as they are characterized by a denser structure of
to-be-processed information. Arstila (2012), for instance, ana-
lyzed the experience of time slowing down in high-anxiety
situations such as accidents. He argued that this experience is
due to not only an acceleration of cognitive processes but also
the awareness of the fact that things are taking less time than
usual. This is where memory and embodiment come into play.
What is retrieved from memory and compared to the current
situation is the embodied knowledge of the specific amount of
time things usually take (e.g., how long it takes to read a word, to
speak a sentence, or to walk a distance of 100m). The second and
most prevalent form of temporal experience is “synchronicity,”
which means that subjective time is constantly synchronized with
conventional clock time, enabling the coordination of internal
and social processes. Synchronicity is the usual way we experi-
ence time, during which people do not have any extraordinary
experiences such as a speeding up, a slowing down, or even
a disappearance of time (see also Hammond, 2012). Finally,
“temporal compression” refers to the reconstruction of temporal
experience retrospectively. Flaherty proposed two possible means
of temporal compression that can be directly related to music
listening. When music is listened to more casually, the listener’s
mind is thought to function in a rather automatic way, so that
“time will be experienced and retroactively constructed as having
flowed quickly” (Holmer Nadesan, 2002, p. 259). On the other
hand, when listeners are captivated or absorbed by music or have
very intense or exceptional experiences (see protracted duration)
“time will be experienced in the present as passing slowly but may
be retroactively interpreted as having passed quickly” (Holmer
Nadesan, 2002, p. 259). In addition, this effect can change when
the experiences made are strong enough to leave traces in episodic
memory, which would lead to the experience being retroactively
interpreted as having lasted longer (see also Croom, 2012; Schäfer
et al., 2013; for an overview about music and engagement).
Flaherty’s (1999) model can explain the prospective experi-
ences of time slowing down (when the music is captivating) and
time speeding up (when the music is only in the background) as
well as the retrospective experiences of time having passed slowly
(when the listening experience was very significant) and time
having passed quickly (when the listening experience was capti-
vating but not very significant). Apparently, the model adopts the
idea of memory storage mentioned above and is a good candi-
date for explaining most of the results found in the time interval
estimation studies. In particular, it may explain why music-filled
intervals are remembered as having lasted longer only when
the experience was outstanding or personally involving. And of
course, this is an interesting point, given that most of the studies
mentioned above used very short intervals and were conducted
in artificial lab settings. That is, whether the passage of time while
listening to music is experienced as being more quickly or more
slowly depends on the emotional involvement of the listener and
on the effects the music causes in that listener.
Models that refer to absorption and ASCs
Another line of explanation for the influence of music on tim-
ing has focused explicitly on the role of absorption and ASCs
in music listening. Most studies about ASCs have been based on
drug research and emphasize the role of various neurotransmitter
processes, such as serotonergic (Wittmann et al., 2007a,b; Sysoeva
et al., 2010), cannabinoid (Mathew et al., 2002; Fachner, 2009),
dopaminergic, and cholinergic (Meck, 1996; Rammsayer, 1999)
interactions with altered time perception and (re)production (see
also Shanon, 2001). Studies of patient populations and drugs
indicate variations in the scaling of musical events attributable
to the deceleration and acceleration of the internal clock and
the internal representation of perceived elements when reproduc-
ing or estimating time intervals in the millisecond-to-second and
the second-to-minute ranges (Meck, 2005). Thus, it is reasonable
to expect endogenous neurochemistry to be activated in various
ways when experiencing ASC phenomena and music.
Research on ASCs has shown that music is one of their most
important triggers. A constant musical rhythm together with
monotonous and repetitive elements seems to lead the listener
to states of absorption, trance, or ecstasy, where the focus of
attention turns to an inner view. That is, the representation of
objects and events in the outside world diminishes somewhat
and attention is focused instead on memories and emotions
elicited by the music. Time just ceases to be important and dis-
appears when attention is captivated by memories and emotions
(Fachner, 2011). This need not mean, however, that listeners—
when asked to state how long a musical experience of a certain
duration has been—are not able to give a very accurate judgment.
At the moment they are asked, they might well-remember how
many songs they had listened to and how long these songs gen-
erally last, so that they are able to reconstruct the elapsed time in
retrospect.
When reviewing the psychobiology of ASCs, Vaitl et al. (2005)
argued that drumming and dancing have been used since time
immemorial to induce trance, which includes a distortion of time
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representation. The distortion seems to depend on the rhythm as
an external timekeeper inducing entrainment of internal biolog-
ical processes. Discussed effects of such auditory-driven entrain-
ment in trance rituals are concomitant changes of brain activity,
as observed in the theta range (Neher, 1961; Berger and Turow,
2011). However, in earlier research, Rouget (1985) stressed that
a successful trance induction depends on the social setting, per-
sonality characteristics, and rhythmic body movements, which
are all variables pertaining to embodiment. His descriptions of
music-induced ASCs—namely, “ecstasy” and “trance”—are con-
nected to the amount of body movement within contexts aim-
ing to induce an ASC. Although trance is connected to dance,
ecstasy describes an inwardly turned ASC accompanied by music
(Fachner, 2011).
As the alert reader has certainly noticed, the approaches
regarding absorption and ASCs refer to the central role of atten-
tion, as well. That is, absorption and ASCs do not provide an
alternative explanation for the effects of music on psychological
timing but they can provide an explanation for how these effects
are mediated by additional variables such as the music’s emo-
tional expression, its likability, and the personality and the state
of the listener.
It is an open and interesting question whether music always
elicits ASCs to some degree. Of course, an appropriate answer
to this question depends on the definition of an ASC. Following
Vaitl et al. (2005), who suggested that we can experience vari-
ous states of consciousness even when we are awake, we agree
that music—that we do not dislike and that does not distract
us from other activities we are engaged in—induces a state of
“trancing” (Becker, 2004), a transient state of being dissociated
from everyday life, a feeling of being temporarily “out of time”
(see also Herbert, 2011). The role of music in such experiences
may be that it acts as a trigger that stirs memories and emo-
tions, enticing the brain to create manifold associations, resulting
in an “inner view.” Such increased imaginableness may be visible
in altered brain activity, on which future studies may shed some
light. Moreover, it remains to be investigated how musical char-
acteristics interact with the characteristics of the listener when an
ASC develops. Music can be fast, loud, and with a steady beat, as,
for example, in gospel music, leading to religious rapture; or the
music can be slow, solemn, and spherical to accompany contem-
plative worshiping (Söhngen, 1967). For Rouget (1985), music
creates emotional conditions, and it structures the chronologi-
cal order of symbolic events, especially in ceremonial settings in
which it is intended to alter consciousness states for individual or
group ritual purposes.
Neurophysiological models
The effects of music on the representation of time can be under-
pinned by neurobiological evidence. We first discuss approaches
related to potential neuronal correlates of an inner clock and then
present evidence specifically related to absorption and ASCs.
As we have shown above, some models on interval timing
incorporate the idea of a pacemaker or internal clock that is task
dependent and state dependent (see Fachner, 2010). Regularly
emitted pacemaker pulses are temporarily stored in an accumu-
lator, and a task-related number of criterion pulses are stored
in reference memory. Time processes and their criterion dura-
tions will be referenced in memory, and subjective responses
can be plotted against a range of task-related scalar expectations.
Although the location of a hypothesized internal clock has not
been determined, researchers have noted that neural oscillations
and the firing of neural assemblies build a time system in the brain
that might be responsible for time perception and production
(see, e.g., Buhusi and Meck, 2005; Teki et al., 2012). Brain areas
that seem to be involved in time processing include the insula
(Wittmann et al., 2007b), the orbitofrontal cortex (Berlin et al.,
2004), the auditory cortex (Sysoeva et al., 2006), the cerebellum
(Teki et al., 2011), the posterior right parietal cortex (Alexander
et al., 2005), the basal ganglia (Teki et al., 2011), and specific
motor areas (Macar et al., 2006).
More specifically, dopamine, serotonin, and acetylcholine have
been found to be involved in the processing of temporal informa-
tion. Different systems appear to be involved in the processing
of shorter and longer durations. The dopaminergic system appar-
ently governs the processing of durations up to about 0.5 or 1 s,
whereas the serotonergic system governs the processing of dura-
tions in the seconds-to-minutes range (e.g., Wittmann et al.,
2007a,b; Wackermann et al., 2008; Sysoeva et al., 2010). Finally,
the memory for temporal events and attention to it seem to be
linked to the acetylcholine system in the frontal cortex. “These
two systems are connected by frontal-striatal loops, thus allowing
for the completion of the timing sequences involved in duration
discrimination” (Meck, 1996, p. 227).
As we have discussed above, music may affect both the pace-
maker, by influencing physiological arousal, and the memory and
reference processes, by distracting attention. Clock speed (pace-
maker) can be influenced by dopaminergic manipulations, the
integration of longer durations can be influenced by seroton-
ergic manipulations, and memory processes (reference) can be
influenced by cholinergic manipulations (Meck, 1996, 2005). It
remains a task for future research to determine in much more
detail if and how music affects these neurotransmitter systems.
Because music can induce emotions it might also modulate
the activity of the locus coeruleus norepinephrine system, which
influences the speed of internal processes such as working mem-
ory performance, decision processes, or behavioral responses (see
Arstila, 2012). As we have described above, Arstila has argued that
the altered speed of inner processes is plotted against the mem-
ory of how much time things usually take, which results in the
experience of a specific speed or flow of time.
Baer et al. (2013; see also Teki et al., 2012) argued that there
might be a dissociation between event-based and emergent timing
mechanisms. Event-based mechanisms (such as finger tapping)
may rely on an inner pacemaker whereas emergent timing mech-
anisms (such as circle drawing) are embodied skills that do not
require a pacemaker. The authors found that musicians are better
than non-musicians only in event-based timing tasks but not in
emergent timing tasks.
Another branch of neurobiological research has been con-
cerned with music, emotions, absorption, and ASC phenomena.
Menon and Levitin (2005) demonstrated a sequence of activa-
tion for music perception and emotion. They found that, starting
from the auditory center, the cascade of activation initializes
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changes in parts of the frontal cortex and from there proceeds
to the mesolimbic reward centers, finally reaching the nucleus
accumbens, releasing waves of dopamine. As expected, the cere-
bellum and the basal ganglia—dopaminergic regions of the
brain involved in motor and timing processes and the analysis
of rhythm and meter in music—became active as well. Phasic
increases in dopamine release happen when meaningful objects
are in the focus of attention; the higher the personal meaning
and valence of the object in focus, the more dopamine is released
(Yacubian and Büchel, 2009).
The functional changes music elicits in the frontal brain
regions have received special attention as part of Dietrich’s (2003)
concept of hypofrontality. The frontal and precentral lobes of
the brain constitute the explicit system, the “active part” that
organizes top-down processing and structures motor activity and
output; the posterior lobes (postcentral, temporal, parietal, and
occipital) are the “receiving parts”—the implicit system of the
brain. They are primarily concerned with sensory input and
with processing bottom-up information in the implicit system.
Dietrich (2003) proposed that the prefrontal cortex, the highest
integrating component in a hierarchy of cognitive functions, is
deregulated in ASCs by ceasing to function in a “normal” way.
This is the hypofrontal (reduced frontal brain activity) state, which
can be compared to the state of flow, in which effortless infor-
mation processing seems to take place. It enables the temporary
suppression of the analytical andmeta-conscious capacities of the
explicit system while being relaxed and absorbed in the flood
of sensory input, allowing people to see things from a differ-
ent perspective or to arrive at new creative solutions to problems
(Dietrich, 2004).
Note that what we have presented here is more a selection
of prominent models than an exhaustive list. Neurophysiological
models are extremely diverse; some of them overlap in their argu-
ments to a certain extent and most of them exhibit a lack of
empirical underpinning. There is as yet no agreement on these
models, which makes research on the representation of time quite
difficult.
DISCUSSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Regarding the impact of music on the representation of time, we
can draw the following conclusions: (1) Typically, music leads
to an underestimation of the length of time intervals; (2) atten-
tion appears to be one of the most important factors when
explaining the impact of music on time perception; and (3) when
taking additional variables into account—such as arousal, emo-
tional expression, familiarity, and likability—the results become
inconsistent and are no longer satisfactorily explained by the
existing approaches. As we have delineated above, attention
might be the mediator between these additional variables and
time perception. For instance, attention to the passage of time
might decrease as a function of the pleasure evoked by the
music because the listener is captivated or distracted. The same
may apply to music-induced arousal and familiarity. Moreover,
we simply do not know if these relationships—if they exist—
are linear. Regarding arousal and familiarity, they might just
as easily be U-shaped, which would make matters even more
complicated.
As shown, many models of human time processing have been
consulted in efforts to understand the effects of music on the
representation of time. And as we have shown, each of these
models can account for a certain proportion of the observed phe-
nomena. However, there is no single model that can account for
all phenomena comprehensively. Moreover, while some of the
models can probably be integrated, others predict contradictory
effects (see Fraisse, 1984). The models differ in four ways: they
follow different approaches (psychological, phenomenological,
neurophysiological); they focus on different phenomena (dura-
tion judgments vs. subjective time flow); they adopt different
research paradigms (prospective vs. retrospective time estima-
tion); and they have been used to explain different effects from
different research settings (time estimation as a primary or a sec-
ondary task). Above, we discussed the first two issues. We now
go into more detail regarding the latter two before presenting
suggestions for further research.
Prospective vs. retrospective time estimation
Prospective time estimation occurs when respondents in a study
are aware that they will have to estimate the length of intervals.
Retrospective time estimation occurs when respondents have to
estimate the length of an interval or their experienced flow of time
only after the interval is over. Note that in empirical research,
judgments about time intervals are almost always given retro-
spectively, that is, after the experience. However, in prospective
settings, the judgment is built during the experience and reported
afterward, whereas in retrospective settings, the judgment is both
built and reported only after the experience. Apparently, com-
pletely different processes are involved when people are asked to
estimate intervals either prospectively or retrospectively (see, e.g.,
Wittmann, 2009). The most prominent difference is the degree
of attention directed toward the time itself. Prospective settings
make people aware of the task of time perception and they will try
to infer the elapsed time as best they can. In retrospective settings,
people do not know that they will have to estimate time intervals
and thus will not specifically focus their attention to the passage
of time.
There is a dissociation of processes involved in the two
types of time perception (see, e.g., Zakay and Block, 2004).
Sitting in silence will cause the impression that time is dragging
because there is just nothing going on that would demand cog-
nitive processing, resulting in constant awareness of the elapsing
time (prospective). However, when asked some time afterward,
the person who has sat in silence would claim that not much
time had elapsed, because there are simply no memories about
that period of time. In retrospect, time shrinks. The same occurs
when people are engaged in routine or boring activities—which
likely accounts for the impression that time seems to go faster
when people get older. In contrast, doing something interesting
or new will cause the impression that time flies because attention
is only occasionally directed toward the passage of time (prospec-
tive), leaving the impression that time has jumped from one
point in time to another point minutes or hours later. In retro-
spect, however, there will be many memories about this period of
time, which will lead to the conclusion that much more time has
elapsed than actually did.
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The challenging point is that attention-based models of time
perception are models that account for prospective time per-
ception only. Specifically, the attentional gate model involves
the opening and closing of an “attentional gate”, which appar-
ently depends on the specific awareness that an estimation of
time intervals is going on. These models can therefore not
account for the dissociation of prospective and retrospective
timing. Memory-based models, on the other side, are more capa-
ble of explaining retrospective timing. They cannot explain the
phenomenon of subjective time flow, however. All the remain-
ing models (phenomenological models, absorption/ASC models,
neurophysiological models) can, in principle, account for both
prospective and retrospective timing, although not all of them
explicitly refer to the difference between the two types of timing.
Time estimation as primary vs. secondary task
A second methodological issue that might account for inconsis-
tent empirical results is whether the time estimation task is a
primary or a secondary task. Because attention turns out to be
a crucial component in time perception it makes a difference how
it is allocated to different tasks that are present at the same time.
In most of the studies mentioned above, the perception of time
intervals was the only task participants had to deal with. In these
types of studies it is easy to investigate the influence of music and
even to compare prospective and retrospective timing. However,
there are also studies where participants had to deal with time per-
ception as a secondary task. These types of settings make it hard
to investigate how people’s attention is distributed to the primary
and the secondary task. Subsequently, it is hard to know whether
prospective timing occurs (when enough attentional resources are
left) or not (when the primary task does not leave any attentional
resources for time processing). The overestimation of elapsed
time under the influence of preferred music—as compared to
experimenter-selected music—found by Cassidy andMacDonald
(2010) is a pertinent example. Participants had to work on a driv-
ing task on a computer while prospective time estimation was
their secondary task. The authors did not report measures of the
allocation of attentional resources. It is conceivable that there
were no attentional resources left so that prospective timing did
not actually occur. If this was the case, judgments would have
been made in retrospect only, leading to the phenomenon just
described: a joyful experience—a result of listening to preferred
music—would afterward seem to have lasted longer. This might
be an explanation of the unexpected finding in this study. Note,
however, that this is only one possible explanation—there might
be further effects occurring with time perception in dual-task
situations that are severely under-researched.
Suggestions for further research
Based on the observation of inconsistent empirical results and
inconsistent explanations, we would like to delineate some sug-
gestions for future research on music and time. (1) Experimental
works should more consistently state whether they adopted a
prospective or a retrospective approach and what exactly has
been measured. (2) Research conducted using either of the two
types of timing should address additional variables that poten-
tially influence the impact of music on time estimation: arousal,
emotional expression, likability, familiarity, absorption, and the
current goals and concerns of the listener. (3) Certainly more the-
orizing is needed not only to integrate these variables into the
existing models of time perception, but also to integrate the two
types of timing into a comprehensive model. This would also
mean rethinking the role of attention as a potential mediator for
all effects of specific variables on time perception. Developing
more sophisticated structural models is recommended. (4) More
theorizing is needed regarding the differences that might arise
when timing is done as either a primary or a secondary task.
Specifically, as one of the first steps, it should be analyzed how
attention is distributed across different tasks at the same time. (5)
Finally, the question of how prospective timing actually occurs is
not well-understood and needs a theoretical and empirical boost.
What exactly do people do when judging the flow of time at a par-
ticular point in time? What actually do they “perceive” in order
to make these judgments? The experience of a particular point
in time—the subjectively experienced now or present—appears
to have an impact on the judgment of longer durations, which
is still under-researched, however (see Pöppel, 2004; Wittmann,
2011; see Le Poidevin, 2009, for a theoretical discussion). We sug-
gest using continuous online measurements (such as continuous
sliders) as well as more qualitative work (e.g., grounded theory)
to figure out what, exactly, is going on. Furthermore, we have
delineated phenomenological approaches to the subjective expe-
rience of time. These models provide a reasonable explanation for
the experienced speed or flow of time. Together with memory-
based models they might be able to explain the whole range of
prospective and retrospective timing. However, we need many
more empirical studies to buttress this notion.
There are further suggestions for further research regarding
the subjective experience of time under the influence of music.
The most obvious question is how the experimental evidence
relates to the subjective experiences. Subjective experiences are
known from research about intense, outstanding, trance-induced,
ecstasy-induced, or drug-induced experiences with music. That
is, all these experiences certainly lie at one extreme end of a music
experience scale. The music listening experiences that have usu-
ally been investigated—or created—in experimental studies are
certainly not that extreme. We must therefore assume that the
experiences differ significantly between these two types of settings
and that we are thus not yet able to compare the experimental evi-
dence and the evidence from subjective reports directly. However,
as just indicated, we believe that all these subjective experiences lie
on the same scale and differ only quantitatively (see also Schäfer
et al., 2013). We could call the scale “music experience” (although
the concept of musikerleben once proposed by Behne (1997), is
maybe a better descriptor).
Apparently, although it is possible to elicit frisson experiences
in a lab setting to some extent (e.g., Blood and Zatorre, 2001),
it is not that easy to bring intense/outstanding experiences with
music into the lab. But it should be possible to do it the other way
round and gather empirical data about time interval estimation
in the field. Doing so could help improve our knowledge about
the relationship between music and the representation of time
in several respects: (1) It could be analyzed if a scale of music
experience or musikerleben—covering usual music experience as
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well as intense experiences with music—can be developed. If it
cannot be developed we would know that music experiences are
categorical. This is exactly the question that has been left open
by Flaherty’s (1999) model: Do experiences with music that leave
traces in memory differ quantitatively or qualitatively from expe-
riences that do not leave traces in memory? (2) Either way, this
knowledge would enable us to integrate the evidence from sub-
jective reports and the empirical evidence on prospective timing.
(3) Further theorizing and empirical research should then occur
regarding the integration of different models of psychological
timing. As delineated above, Flaherty’s (1999) model appears to
explain the subjective experience of time quite well. We deem
it absolutely promising to combine this model with attention-
based andmemory-basedmodels of prospective and retrospective
timing. Such an integrative approach would have two additional
advantages. First, in the course of investigating attention-based
and memory-based models of time perception, knowledge has
accumulated about its physiological and neuronal correlates. This
knowledge would enrich an integrative model and render it more
comprehensive. Second, Flaherty’s (1999) model proposes that
personal, social, motivational, and emotional variables would
mediate the way music influences the experience of time. As dis-
cussed, these variables have not yet been recognized sufficiently
and have led to inconsistent empirical results, respectively. They
should be incorporated as well.
MUSIC AND THE REPRESENTATION OF SPACE
Whereas altered representation of time has been investigated to a
greater or lesser extent in empirical studies, there are far fewer
investigations on the representation of space while listening to
music. By “representation of space” we mean the way people per-
ceive the space around them, such as the distance, size, shape,
and movement of objects and other persons. Note that we do not
present research on the effect of music on spatial abilities (cf.,
the Mozart effect) because it is still unclear if this effect really
does incorporate a change in the representation of spatial objects
(e.g., Husain et al., 2002). There is more anecdotal evidence than
assured knowledge of how the representation of space is altered
when people are captivated by music.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE INFLUENCE OF MUSIC ON THE
REPRESENTATIONOF SPACE
In their descriptive system on strong experiences related to music,
Gabrielsson and Lindström Wik (2003, p. 174) found one broad
category—changed experience of situation, body and mind, time
and space, wholeness. This category seems to contain far more
descriptions of changed experience of time than of changed expe-
rience of space. When the respondents referred to space, they
usually reported that it ceased to exist.
Regarding changes to the usual representation of space,
Herbert (2011) found people to have a sense of music blending
with the environment, to use music to “give a filmic quality to
their surroundings” (p. 59), and to experience their surround-
ings as “choreographed.” Typically, the visual sense seems to
be enhanced but awareness is focused only on select objects of
the external environment. The more the person is captivated or
absorbed by the music the more experience is characterized by
“narrowed awareness, inwardly focused attention, and a lessened
orientation to reality” (p. 190).
There have been some studies showing that the representation
of spatial magnitudes can be associated with musical character-
istics. For instance, it appeared that high frequencies convey a
better representation of space than low frequencies because the
former are easier to localize (Fachner, 2000; see also DeSouza
et al., 1974). The perception of space under the influence of music
may also be influenced by motion imagery induced by certain
musical elements. When investigating the relationship of specific
musical andmotional parameters, Eitan andGranot (2006) found
that aspects of timing were related to speed, aspects of pitch con-
tour were related to vertical and horizontal movements (pitch
fall moves downward and to the left) and to distance (pitch fall
is associated with decreasing distance), and aspects of loudness
were related to distance and energy. Christensen (1996) argued
that intensity, timbre, and (pitch) space of auditory events are
vital aspects of microtemporal localization strategies within the
physical environment; although music may represent nomothetic
“real-world” aspects of spatial relations [“high” vs. “low” (pitch)],
it actually creates a virtual time-space within listeners based on
ideographic metrics and states. Dolscheid et al. (2013) concluded
that metaphors such as high vs. low pitch—which is thin vs. thick
pitch, light vs. heavy pitch, young vs. old pitch, or weak vs. strong
pitch in different languages—must all be partly innate but are
reshaped and strengthened by language. Musical metaphors facil-
itate spatial associations and can therefore have an impact on the
subjective experience of the spatial environment.
In general, rhythm appears to be the predominant musical
feature inducing ASCs (see Fachner, 2006). Baldemair (2003) sug-
gested that techno dancers lose their ordinary sense of space when
they experience states of vertigo owing to the music’s charac-
teristics (fast tempi, monotonous sounds, unexpected breaks).
She also suggested a need for temporal decomposition of self-
awareness that can be managed through music and dance. Hill
(2002, as cited in Becker-Blease, 2004, p. 92) described new-age
and ambient music as “celestial or cosmic music [that] removes
listeners from their ordinary acoustical surroundings by creat-
ing stereo sound images of vast, apparently dimensionless spatial
environments, in a word—spacey.”When listeners described their
experiences under the influence of mind-altering drugs, subjec-
tive alterations of “acoustic space” were mentioned (Tart, 1971).
There is also evidence that musicians often experience music
as a spatial–temporal image. When investigating predictors of
music sight-reading ability in high school wind players, Gromko
(2004) found that “reading music is a spatial process that may be
like the reading of two-dimensional architectural drawings that
are comprehended as three-dimensional objects. In other words,
when skilled musicians read musical notation, they may mentally
represent the sound as an image with spatial and temporal dimen-
sions” (p. 12). When investigating novice musicians, McLachlan
et al. (2010) (p. 12) found that “sound attributes such as pitch,
loudness, duration, and location are spatially encoded in a multi-
dimensional array in ASTM [auditory short term memory].”
In sum, it has been found that music can (1) distort the
ordinary perception of space, (2) cause the experience of space
ceasing to exist, (3) be used as a source of information about the
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movement of objects through space, and (4) trigger spatial men-
tal images. Apparently, most of these experiences again have been
reported in very intense or outstanding listening situations. To
date, there are no studies that investigated if there are any changes
in the representation of space under the influence of music in
usual everyday listening situations.
EXPLANATIONS FOR THE INFLUENCE OF MUSIC ON THE
REPRESENTATIONOF SPACE
Due to the scant evidence regarding this issue it is not pos-
sible to provide a comprehensive explanation. Nonetheless, we
would like to delineate some approaches that can help explain the
effects of music on the representation of space. Blood and Zatorre
(2001) demonstrated that the visual cortex shows decreased activ-
ity during chill experiences induced by music. This may be an
explanation of the illusion that space ceases to exist. This line of
neurobiological research has to be linked with subjective expe-
riences in much more detail in the future. In addition, more
research is needed to clarify how the processing of time and the
processing of space are intertwined. Changes in time processing
might cause changes in the representation of space, and vice versa
(see final discussion).
An inquiry on out-of-body experiences has shown that peo-
ple are more likely to experience an ASC in immobility, when
lying supine or sitting (Zingrone et al., 2010), when the focus
of attention can turn inward, and more afferent information is
processed—a finding that corroborates Rouget’s (1985) concept
of ecstasy. Deep experiences of hypnosis in immobility have been
found to be accompanied by alterations of body image (Cardena,
2005). It seems that the moment of an ASC experience is related
to a motionless, inwardly turned attention, evoking images and
emotions, while the person is perceiving a temporary disappear-
ance of spatial relations and perspective on his or her own body
in a private space.
DISCUSSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Apparently, we are not able to provide a final conclusion about
the influence of music on the representation of space. We have,
however, learned thatmusic can have such an influence and that it
has typically been observed during intense or outstandingmusical
experiences. Most of the reported experiences refer to a distortion
of spatial representations or the feeling that space simply disap-
pears. Regarding approaches to explaining these effects, there is
not much on the table either. We can summarize that there are
two promising approaches so far. One involves the neurobiologi-
cal finding that changes in the activation of the occipital cortex
due to music listening might change the way listeners process
and experience spatial information. The other approach would
be one that highlights the role of attention. The majority of sub-
jective reports about an altered representation of space during
intense experiences with music have emphasized that attention
has turned inward and that the representation of the outer world
has faded into the background. We have argued above that space
and time are represented rather than perceived. That is, they
are mental constructions requiring mental processing, which is
influenced by the attention that is directed toward it. A lack of
attention might result in distorted or inaccurate mental images
that differ from the usual images we have about the outside world.
We believe that attention plays a central role in the processing of
spatial information.
Thus, there is a long list of questions for future research. (1)
What role does attention play in the representation of space?
(2) How are the representation of space and time intertwined?
Could attention be the central variable that accounts for effects
of music in both areas? (3) Can neurobiological effects of musical
experiences be related more concretely to subjective experiences?
(4) Can distortions in the representation of space be found in
experimental settings? This question bears a large potential for
empirical studies. Potential effects of music on the processing of
spatial information could be analyzed using eye-tracking or spa-
tial perception tasks. (5) Finally—as we mentioned regarding the
representation of time, as well—we want to know if music always
affects spatial processing to a certain degree, and not only dur-
ing intense experience. Again, this degree of influence could be
related to the degree of what we called “music experience” or
“musikerleben.”
FINAL DISCUSSION
Music affects not only our emotions, motivation, and actions
but also the way we experience the world on a very basic level:
the experience of space and time. Music can make time go by
slower or faster and it can even create the experience that time
disappears. It can lead to the impression that a period of time
has had a shorter or longer duration than it actually had. It can
also make objects in the world or the world itself appear to look
different or to even disappear. We have learned that there is con-
siderable research about the influence of music on the experience
of time, in terms of both time interval estimates and subjective
experiences, but that there is a considerable lack of research on
the influence of music on the experience of spatial information.
We have also learned that there have been attempts to explain all
these effects, although, again, there have been more—and more
sophisticated—approaches regarding time than regarding space.
We have delineated several suggestions for further research, the
most important of which deal with the clarification of the role of
attention, the integration of experimental and subjective evidence
in models of psychological timing, the integration of knowledge
regarding the observed effect of music on the representation of
both space and time, and the investigation of a variable we called
music experience.
Space and time are the two concepts with which we describe
our physical existence in the universe. There is, however, a disso-
ciation between these two concepts: We can perceive space more
or less directly but we cannot perceive time (DeLong, 1981).
Of course, our mental images of space or objects in space are
also a representation and are affected by learning and expecta-
tion, among other influences, but there is a physical basis that
we can perceive through our senses. Time, in contrast, does not
have a comparable physical basis; we are not able to perceive
time through our senses. This is evidenced by the way we think
about time, namely, through spatial metaphors. One classic exam-
ple is that people in the Western world usually associate the past
with the left space and the future with the right space. Bonato
et al. (2012, p. 2270) recently reviewed the relevant literature and
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concluded that “overall, there should be no doubt that the pro-
cessing of time is not independent of the processing of space.”
They also discussed some approaches to explaining this space–
time interaction. For instance, the mental timeline model holds
that temporal information is represented by a spatial timeline.
Hence, temporal processing would be affected by spatial infor-
mation but not vice versa. Some studies have found that this
is the case (see Casasanto and Boroditsky, 2008; Calabria et al.,
2011). This dissociation probably is the reason for our finding
that space is not influenced by music listening as much as time is.
Spatial information seems to be much less malleable and prone to
representational distortions than is temporal information.
We now summarize what we have learned regarding the role
of embodiment in the impact of music on the representation of
space and time and make some final remarks.
MUSIC, SPACE, TIME, AND THE EMBODIEDMIND
Is the experience of music an embodied experience? Based on
our review, the answer is clearly yes. The overarching assump-
tion of the embodied mind idea is that the shape of the body
influences the shape of the mind. The body is a physical object
that is positioned in and can move through physical space and
time. The body’s positioning andmovements are perceived by the
sensory system and thus provide the basis for themental represen-
tation of space and time, which is intrinsic to all cognitions and
behaviors. We have shown that music has the power to transform
the representation of spatial and temporal magnitudes, which
results in experiences regarding the speed of time, the duration
of time periods, and the appearance of space that are detached to
a varying degree from their physical basis. Music is shaped time,
it unfolds in time, and it is made through certain actions with
real things (instruments or vocal folds and facial muscles). The
experiences music elicits—including their spatial and temporal
aspects—therefore mirror the enactive character of music, where
“enactive in this context signifies that perception (and experience
more generally) is characterized by a structural coupling between
the agentive body and its environment in a way that generates
action-oriented meaning” (Gallagher, 2013, p. 141).
As we noted earlier, there are a large number of psychological
and neurophysiological theories/models of time perception and
space perception that can all contribute to explaining the effects
of music. We have also noted that these models argue on differ-
ent levels (e.g., objective measurements of duration judgments vs.
subjective experiences) and are hard to reconcile. Nevertheless—
or precisely because of this—we would like to risk an attempt
to provide a working model of the influences of music on the
representation of space and time, which includes all the empir-
ical results and theoretical notions that fit together well (see
Figure 1). There are genetic factors that—mediated by dopamine,
serotonin, norepinephrine, and acetylcholine—govern the pro-
cessing of time intervals, the speed of internal processes, and
the incorporation of memory and self-related concepts. There
is a dissociation between shorter intervals (up to 0.5 or 1 s),
apparently responsible for the unconscious or implicit timing of
behavior, and longer intervals that provide the time frames for
consciousness-accessible units (time objects). These time frames
can range from 0.5 to 3 s of physical time and are separated by the
desynchronization/reorganization of cell assemblies in the brain
(gaps). Each of these units is experienced as a moment of nowness
or as the present. Gaps facilitate the conscious comparison of a
certain number of units with both physical time (that can be read
from a watch or inferred from circadian rhythms) and memory
(how long the current experience usually lasts). This comparison
leads to the experienced flow of time and provides the basis for
FIGURE 1 | Summary of the numerous influences of music listening on the representation of space and time. See text for a detailed explanation. ASCs,
altered states of consciousness.
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judgments about given durations. Both subjective time flow and
“objective” duration judgments are malleable because the length
of the units is variable, just as is the occurrence and frequency of
the gaps. These two parameters are influenced by a large number
of factors, including the present situation, current environmen-
tal cues or stimuli, other ongoing activities, the physiological
condition of the body, and the person’s current mood, affective
disposition, concerns and motivations, age, and personality.
Music, as an embodied or enactive experience, can affect the
processes described in the model in several ways. Musical charac-
teristics can influence the length of the units and the occurrence
and frequency of the gaps. The number of notes or chords that are
tied together to a single phrase or unit is variable and there might
be fewer or even no gaps between the units when musical phrases
span a larger number of notes or chords. When music leads
to captivation, absorption, dissociation, or other kinds of ASCs
this can influence the occurrence and frequency of gaps. Fewer
gaps will occur the more the listener is absorbed by the music.
Whenever there is a gap, however, the current experience can be
compared with memory, resulting in a relative feeling of time
flow that also provides the basis for duration judgments (both
prospectively and retrospectively). Memory, of course, is also
affected by musical experiences in the past in terms of familiarity,
preference, and associations.
Regarding the representation of space, we have concluded that
there are practically no reports about alterations in the percep-
tion of real objects caused by music listening. What we have are
some embodied associations between musical characteristics and
real-world objects as to their size or energy and their movement
through space. For instance, faster music is associated with more
energy than slower music; louder music is associated with more
energy than quieter music; lower pitch is associated with the res-
onance of larger objects while higher pitch is associated with
smaller objects (see, e.g., Huron, 2006). Such associations may
also be responsible for music imagery. We found more evidence
regarding the experience that the outer space ceases to exist under
the influence of music—at least in situations of high absorption.
The reason for this effect might be quite simple. Given that music
listening is an embodied experience, it is associated with spe-
cific actions or movements in space. These associations might
interfere with the perception of the outer world that is currently
present. This is why the focus of awareness shifts inward to facil-
itate unfolding of the embodied associations and emotions. It
might also explain why we like to close our eyes when we are (or
want to get) captivated by the music we listen to.
We consider this model more a collection of consistent evi-
dence and theoretical approaches than a conclusive model of
causal processes and relationships. Many of the proposed rela-
tionships are speculative and should be investigated in future
research.
FINAL REMARKS
We believe that understanding the effects of music on the pro-
cessing of time and space can lead to insights on the emergence
of music in human evolution. We have mentioned that rhythm is
a central aspect of music and that rhythmic entrainment might
have played an important role in the coordination of common
activities in prehistoric times (see also Huron, 2006). Interest in
the role of sounds and music in the course of human evolution
has started to grow again (see, e.g., Horowitz, 2012) and it has
been argued that much more research is needed in this respect:
The role and effect of sound and the human experience of sound in
archaeological environments is severely under-researched. Sound
is a primary source of information about the world, and the
human experience of sound shapes many of the ways in which we
interact with the world and with each other (Cross and Watson,
2006, p. 107).
Brandt et al. (2012, p. 13) have gone one step further to conclude
that musicality is essential to language acquisition: “Listening to
music may give us insights into how language sounds to us before
we understand it—and how we experience our world before we
have words.”
Our results may also be deemed inducement to rethink the
concepts of invariant, physical space and time in psychological
research. Obviously, the suggestions we have raised concern-
ing future research on approaches and models explaining the
effects of music on the experience of space and time are of a
more far-reaching nature. In particular, our suggestions regard-
ing the models of time perception are quite general and not
restricted to the influence of music. We believe that the biggest
task in the future will be to reconcile the heterogeneous mod-
els of time processing, thereby integrating the psychological, the
phenomenological, and the neurophysiological levels (see also
Michon, 1993, who proposed a framework of seven criteria that
should be taken into account when formulating a coherent theory
of psychological timing).
Not least, we would applaud any attempt by psychologists to
pay more attention to the subjectivity and dynamics of spatial
and temporal experiences. This has been done rather reluctantly
in the past although this is not a new postulation: “The future
of cognitive science may thus lie in a delicately negotiated union
between the familiar framework of computational, representa-
tional and information-processing description, and the challeng-
ing and temporally charged project of dynamical analysis” (Clark,
1998, p. 370). Yet, the ancient Greeks distinguished chronological
time—conventional time by the clock oriented to the geophysi-
cal concept of time—from kairological time—personal, individual
time. Kairological time emerges from personal perception of
time and periods of time. The right time for doing something,
deciding or acting in the “here and now” (Aldridge, 1996) are
kairological expressions of time. Anticipation of what is com-
ing up next and what is needed to be perceived is surely of vital
interest to humans so that it is important to know not only
“where to place attention, but also when” (Eagleman et al., 2005).
Pleasant situations fly by whereas unpleasant ones seem to last
for hours. People experience special moments or situations that
interfere with their personal set of emotions, habits, and beliefs.
Depending on the situation, time is perceived as decelerated or
accelerated. Thus, the concept of kairological, personal time is
much closer to what people really experience than is the con-
cept of a constant physical, chronological time. We are well on the
way to bringing this ancient knowledge back into psychological
research.
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